On What Exactly Constitutes Speech

Actually a spin-off of web browsing I did while putting together On Questioning Patriotism, on the general concept of speech, and what constitutes speech for the purposes of freedom of speech - philosophically, not according to current law - and what does not, I find myself generally in agreement with commenter Dave Schuler, in this Dean's World post:

But—and I realize this is an unpopular position—I don't believe that conduct is speech. Period. Nine theoreticians in the Supreme Court notwithstanding. And I think that protest (meaning marches, demonstrations, and the like) is only legitimate under very specific and rare circumstances. Otherwise it's just a low level of insurrection.

In a liberal representative democracy there is no freedom to get your own way. Convince, cajole, persuade, lobby, organize, elect. But if you fail to get your way by doing these things raising hell until you do get your own way is just tyranny.

Well, perhaps not tyranny per se, but nonetheless, something very ugly, as there has ever been something very ugly about the power of the Mob; and popular coercion is every bit as much to be despised as government tyranny.

Which is why the Cerebrate and self-designated activists don't get along.